The impact of military engagement in disaster management on civil-military relations by Malešič, Marjan
1  
  
The Impact of Military Engagement in Disaster Management on Civil- 
Military Relations   
Marjan Malešič1  
Abstract  
The frequency, scope, and intensity of natural disasters are increasing, and so too are the number 
of victims, related deaths, and the amount of economic damage. The increasing frequency of 
disasters often overwhelms civilian management structures and demands the engagement of the 
military.  This has generated new problems and controversies. However, mainstream 
scholarship in this field has so far failed adequately to address civil-military relations in disaster 
management. This article highlights the issue and addresses the various arguments used to 
advocate or reject military involvement in disaster management: militarisation, utilitarian, 
security-strategic, functional-humanitarian, and rejection-isolation arguments. This 
epistemological and ontological approach identifies, depicts, and classifies the arguments. It 
also identifies the various controversies that accompany military engagement in disaster 
management as a basis for future research into civil-military relations in the field.   
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Introduction   
Natural disasters represent one of the most evident threats to humanity, all the more so as a 
result of climate change.  Nevertheless, natural disasters have received relatively modest 
attention in debates on national and international security. The Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) regularly reports natural disaster statistics on a global level. 
In the decade from 2002-2011 the average annual disaster frequency was 394 casesi.  The 
average annual number of deaths from disasters was 107,000; the total number of victims 268 
million, and the economic damage was estimated at $143 billion.  The geographical distribution 
of disasters over the last decade indicates that Asia is the most affected region, followed by the 
Americas, Europe, Africa, and Oceania.  In terms of countries, China, the United States, the 
Philippines, India, and Indonesia constitute the top five most frequently hit by natural disasters 
(CRED, 2013: 1, 2).   
The data reveals that natural and non-natural disasters represent a major threat to national and 
international security. Countries and international organisations have developed structures to 
respond to disasters, although the quality of those structures varies from country to country and 
from one international organisation to another. As a rule, developing countries tend to lack 
comprehensive and stable civilian structures for dealing with disasters, therefore disaster 
response in developing countries often relies almost entirely upon the military as well as on 
international civilian and military assistance.  In developed countries, civilian disaster response 
structures exist and operate at relatively high levels; nevertheless, in the event of a major 
disaster, the military may be called upon to provide assistance to the civilian structures; while 
international organisations also often collaborate in the response.ii   
Since the turn of the millennium, the frequency, scope, and intensity of disasters have increased.  
Some disasters exceed the available civilian capabilities and require the engagement of military 
equipment and personnel to save lives and protect property. As a result, the role of the military 
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in disaster management and in civilian crisis management in general has become a topic for 
debate.    
The recent literature on disaster management (see for example Weeks, 2007, SIPRI, 2008,  
Barber, 2009, Marret, 2009, Arcala Hall and Cular, 2010, Kapucu, 2011, Ferris 2012, Briggs, 
2012, Mamuji, 2012, Tatham et. al., 2012) focuses on military engagement in disaster response 
and covers themes such as: the legal issues; civil-military cooperation; the effectiveness of 
military assistance in responding to a disaster; the problem of leadership; coordination; 
divergent civil and military organisational cultures; and the public’s perception of military 
assistance.  By comparison, our article predominantly focuses on the content and frequency of 
the various arguments that have been advanced about military engagement in disaster response, 
and on their impact on civil-military relations.   
Conventional theories of civil-military relations have so far paid little attention to this issue.  It 
is clear that a disaster which requires the armed forces to work alongside civilian rescue and 
search teams, the general public, political decision-makers and humanitarian organisations 
represents opportunities for a unique civil-military interface.  This can foster cooperation and a 
mutual transfer of values.  Alternatively, it may result in competition, conflict, and a clash of 
organisational cultures.  These ideas are not new, but have become more significant given the 
advances in civil-military relations.  The opportunity is even greater when one takes into 
account the statistical frequencies and intensities of the disasters depicted above, and the ever 
greater presence of the military in disaster management, which highlights the need for further 
studies on civil-military relationships.iii  
A brief review of the recent scientific articles and books in the field of civil-military relations 
suggests that most authors still predominantly base their analyses on the traditional works, 
namely either Huntington’s ‘The Soldier and the State’ (1957), or of Janowitz’s ‘The 
Professional Soldier’ (1960).  As suggested by Croissant and Kuehn (2011: 131), Huntington 
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and Janowitz produced a bifurcation in civil-military research into a political science strand and 
a sociological strand.  The latter predominantly studied topics such as the bureaucratic 
organisation of the military, military families, sexual, racial, minority and gender integration 
into the military, public opinion of the military and alike; whereas the former were mostly 
concerned with political control of the armed forces, the subordination of the military to the 
legitimate civilian leadership, military professionalism, the ‘management of violence’, and so 
forth.  We investigated several concepts, such as the military as internally structured 
phenomenon (Segal et al. 1974), new military professionalism (Sarkesian, 1981), the military’s 
distinctive organisational culture (Boëne, 1990), the idea of a postmodern military (Moskos, 
2000), the key dimensions of civil-military relations (Dandeker, 2000), and the ‘culture gap’ 
(Feaver and Kohn, 2001).  We also analysed other concepts that emphasise that the civil-
military concept is broader in its nature, as a result of which the ‘civilian’ component can be 
divided into those civilians who represent the authorities and those who comprise the general 
public (Cohn, 2003).  Thus, on one hand, civil-military relations can refer to the interface 
between the military and the political establishment, and on the other hand to the relationship 
between the military and civilian society (Pinch, 2003).   
Nielsen (2012: 369) has summarised the current American approach to civil-military relations 
and has established that Huntington’s work remains the essential starting point for discussion, 
despite the profound social and strategic changes that have taken place in society, and despite 
the active research of political scientists, sociologists and historians in the field.  Although some 
of them have criticised Huntington, none of them have yet transcended his work.  This 
observation is somewhat contentious given the fact that several scholars (including those 
mentioned above) have followed in the tradition of Janowitz in promoting the sociological 
strand of civil-military relations.    
A similar review of the European scene reveals that there have been attempts to introduce 
political science innovations into the field of civil-military relations (Croissant and Kuehn,  
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2011: 132). These attempts extend beyond ‘civilian control of the military’ and deal with the 
influence of parliaments, the media, the public and broader civil society and their impact on 
civil-military relations. New concepts of ‘democratic control of the military’ (Born et al., 2004) 
and ‘security sector governance’ (Hängi, 2004) have been introduced which have also 
advocated methodological pluralism and have tried to overcome the traditional positivist 
epistemology of civil-military relations.iv   
Therefore civil-military relations extend far beyond the relationship between the military and 
the civilian authorities.  It also involves civil society as a significant actor.  It is interesting to 
observe that those analysts who follow in the Huntington tradition of the functional and social 
imperative and who want to transcend it do not recognise disaster management as one of the 
important fields in which civil-military relations occur.  Moreover, in several countries disaster 
management is an important military duty, not only in terms of public perception but in practice 
as well.v   
The intention of this article is to help refocus the debate, although we recognise that there are 
several dimensions of civil-military relations in the disaster management process.  Rather than 
attempting to address them all here, we will instead scrutinise the nature of the pro and contra 
arguments and their motivation.  In our view, the knowledge of the arguments and the 
motivation behind them is crucial for understanding civil-military relations in disaster 
management, and this creates a solid basis for future research that could specifically focus on 
the various characteristics of civil-military relations in disaster management.  
This article is an epistemological and ontological attempt to identify, to depict and to classify 
the various arguments that are implicit in the theoretical considerations of the role of the military 
in disaster management.  Our primary method is an analysis of the discourse that goes beyond 
the positivist approach and attempts to find answers to research questions in the constructivist 
6  
  
mode. Our approach is concerned with the broader context of civil-military relations and takes 
into account the various influences and practices (comp. Freistein, 2011:  
167). Disaster management is a subject to be studied in the context of civil-military relations.      
We will focus on the following research questions: (1) What are the main theoretical arguments 
for military engagement in disaster response, and which of them have been confirmed in 
practice by recent global events?  (2)  Do the nature of those arguments and their justifications 
predict the characteristics of civil-military relations in disaster management?  In order to answer 
these questions, we will first explore the theory of military collaboration in disaster response 
and attempt to identify, depict, and classify the key arguments used.  We will then perform a 
secondary analysis of the recent scientific and professional reports on disaster response in order 
to confirm the presence of the various arguments and assess their explanatory power as applied 
to recent disaster cases.  And finally, we will estimate the potential impact of these arguments 
on the characteristics of civil-military relations, and suggest where future research in the field 
would prove beneficial.    
The Military in the Disaster Response Process  
The theoretical discourse on the role of the military in the process of disaster management (e.g. 
Perry and Travayiakis, 2007, Amudson et al., 2008, Brattberg, 2013) suggests that countries 
offer military assistance to affected countries and their population due to the benefits they 
receive from offering assistance.  For instance, offering assistance may improve their global 
image, particularly within those countries to which they extend their help.  Armitage and Nye 
(2008) claim that, by collaborating in disaster management, armed forces have on many 
occasions proved that they can generate soft power for their countries. Hence, disaster 
assistance becomes an important diplomatic activity.vi  
Some authors (Tritten, 2013, Arcala Hall, 2008) believe that military disaster response in 
foreign countries can also promote positive security effects by improving the securitystrategic 
position of donor countries, while at the same time disaster assistance might have a favourable 
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impact on regional security relations, especially in those areas of the world that are disaster-
prone (e.g. parts of Asia).   
Also important is Hoffman and Hudson’s (2009: 1) observation  that military involvement in 
disaster management is driven by the military’s own concern to improve its public image, to 
use disaster response as a form of training, and to diversify military role in times of austerity 
and military budget cuts.  Consequently, there is a growing interest in official circles in the  
US and the EU in deploying civil defence and military assets outside their home territories.  
This has generated a few concerns in light of the fact that a military presence in a humanitarian 
mission could, especially in a conflict environment, compromise the neutrality and the 
independence of humanitarian organisations, and could restrict humanitarian access and 
actually increase security risks. Some even argue, as Hoffman and Hudson note (2009: 2), that 
military involvement in humanitarian relief is ‘inefficient, inappropriate, inadequate and 
expensive, contrary to humanitarian principles, and driven by political imperatives rather than 
humanitarian need.’   
Hoffman and Hudson (2009: 2) maintain that, despite the criticism, many humanitarian actors 
accept the idea that the military can play a legitimate and vital role in supporting humanitarian 
relief efforts. The argument is that humanitarian organisations should engage more strategically 
with military organisations in order to overcome the possible risks that may arise from civil-
military cooperation, and to reinforce the potential benefits that military involvement could 
bring to the affected population. Marret (2009: 339) appears to agree, noting that one part of 
the humanitarian community remains sceptical and critical of the role of the military in 
humanitarian affairs which they perceive as ‘militarised humanitarianism.’  Nevertheless, there 
is another part of the humanitarian community that recognises the successes as well as the 
inadequacies of the military response to humanitarian challenges.   
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Similarly, Etkin et al. (2014: 11-12) have identified two divergent perspectives on the role of 
military assets in the disaster relief process:  one that is supportive of ‘militarisation’ and 
requires a greater military presence; the other is critical of a military approach to managing 
disasters.  Etkin et al. (2014: 26–27) conclude that the military forces of democratic nations can 
make a major contribution to disaster relief; nevertheless, military assets should be selectively 
and adequately employed to supplement as opposed to replace civilian disaster management 
authorities and assets.  The involvement of the military in the disaster management matrix 
would be efficient if the military commanders planned and coordinated together with civilian 
authorities, and if civilian and military actors were able to overcome the difficulties that stem 
from their different cultures.  
Desch (quoted by Arcala Hall and Cular, 2010: 62) believes that, due to its transitional nature 
and strict time limitations, disaster relief is relatively uncontroversial compared to other types 
of domestic military missions. In a democracy, it does not threaten the civil-military power 
balance.  Mandel (quoted by Arcala Hall and Cular, 2010: 64, 65) warns of the dangers of 
militarising the relief process.  Instead, he advocates a more targeted deployment of the better 
equipped and mobile military units, confined to those instances where the more modest civilian 
relief organisations and NGOs lack such capacity.   
Some authors stress that there are several potential pitfalls to military humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief that need to be taken into account. Laksmana (2010), for example, warns that 
military resources are suitable only for high-intensity, short-term missions, and not for long-
term engagements of several weeks or months. The latter might divert the military from their 
traditional mission of ‘violence management’.  Furthermore, humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief require different training and equipment than traditional military tasks.  In terms 
of their organisational culture and ethos, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions 
are required to respect humanitarian principles; they also require patience, restraint, and 
flexibility. Laksmana (2010) also highlights a few other important issues, including:   the 
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influence of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief on civil-military relations; the 
dependence of civilian structures on military capabilities; and, consequently, the militarisation 
of civilian functions in disaster management.  
This also raises the question of military disaster relief:  ‘at what point in the spectrum of support 
does assistance become interference?’ (Civil-Military Relations in Disaster Response).  
Meanwhile, from the military perspective, some commanders may be concerned that providing 
disaster relief becomes a distraction from their primary mission, namely the defence of their 
own country.  Other military leaders regard humanitarian support as an appropriate duty that 
advances their nation’s overall policy objectives, and therefore are more readily accepting of 
deployment to complex crises in order to minimise casualties.   
The role of the military in disaster management and the nature of civil-military relations are 
also discussed in the context of the human security concept (Futamura et al., 2011). Futamura 
et al believe that, in civil conflicts, the military may sometimes be the primary threat to human 
security.  Whereas, in the case of disasters, the military’s operational capacities and experience 
of working in the field means that it may become the crucial guarantor of human security.   
Any discussion of civil-military relations also needs to address the public’s acceptance of the 
support role played by the military in disasters. The Intertect Study (1989) established an 
association between disaster relief and military involvement in the public’s view:  the public 
expect military units to assist the civilian population immediately following a large-scale 
disaster.  From the public’s perspective, this is a humanitarian act; from the military perspective, 
this represents an opportunity to strengthen its legitimacy in civil society.    
Fisher (2011) reports that many experts, influenced by the experiences of complex disasters, 
have advocated that humanitarian relief should become one of the core and standardised tasks 
of a modern army.  This proposal assumes that civilian authorities are often overwhelmed by 
huge disasters and therefore military assistance is a rational choice. Therefore, disaster relief 
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should be ‘the main part of military business, not simply a secondary task’.  On the other hand, 
there is considerable disagreement among government agencies and humanitarian organisations 
as to whether the benefits of military assistance outweigh the costs.  The benefits might be said 
to include:  unique military capabilities, transport, logistics, medical equipment, and timely 
rapid deployment.  Meanwhile, the costs are variously said to include: the financial costs, the 
risk of militarising relief work and potential security concerns, especially when the military 
operates in a foreign country.    
The Content of Theoretical Arguments   
The abstract view of the theoretical considerations concerning military engagement in disaster 
response clearly demonstrates several types of argument which we could label ‘utilitarian’, 
‘security-strategic’, ‘militarisation’, ‘functional-humanitarian’, and ‘rejection-isolation’ 
arguments (see Table 1).   
Table1: Classification of Arguments  
Utilitarian argument  strategic national interests, 
 
the public image of the deploying country, 
 
the political and economic benefits, 
 
the public image of the military and its legitimacy in 
society,   
Security-strategic argument  the security position of deploying country, 
 
relations with allies, 
 
military disaster management as a soft power, 
 
the contribution to human security, 
 
military operational gains, 
 
the variety of military roles,   
 






Militarisation argument  military presence in disaster management, 
 
military assistance as a first or last resort,  
 
militarising effects  
 
the centralisation of disaster response  
Functional-humanitarian argument  the military in overcoming disaster consequences, 
 
the population and authorities need assistance, 
 
the capabilities of the military in terms of personnel, 
 
equipment, and the expertise to help people in need  
Rejection-isolation argument  distraction from other military missions, 
 
a rational use of military capabilities, 
 
a division of labour, 
 
the isolation of the military from society; 
 
restrictions on foreign military assistance, 
 
the country isolated from the international community  
Source: the author  
The utilitarian argument emphasises the benefits to the deploying country by engaging its troops 
on disaster sites in a foreign country. There is an expectation on the part of the sending country 
that their image in the world will improve, that they may realise certain national strategic 
interests, and that they stand to make diplomatic, trade, and security gains.  Also, the country 
will be able to promote its overall policy objectives by collaborating in disaster management. 
When it comes to military disaster response within a national framework, politicians and 
military commanders both expect to be able to observe an improvement in the image and 
prestige of the military among the public, and that the military’s legitimacy in society will 
increase. There is also a cost-benefit analysis behind this argument: the benefits to the military 
far outweigh the costs involved.  Military assistance in a disaster is arguably predominantly 
motivated by political reasons; humanitarian motivations are only of secondary importance.   
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Closely related to the utilitarian argument is the security-strategic argument that assesses how 
a military disaster response may influence the security and strategic position of the sending 
country both in the receiving country and in the wider region. This argument holds that 
international military assistance tends to promote better relations with allies and to strengthen 
the position of the country in the regional security milieu. The engagement of the military in 
disaster management is also seen as a form of soft power implementation in that the political 
influence of the country abroad expands as a consequence. By collaborating in disaster 
management, the military contributes to the reinforcement of human security.  Responding to a 
disaster also promises potential operational gains, such as a diversification of military roles, 
various modes of training, and a higher morale among staff.  
The militarisation argument is critical of the increasingly militarised response to disasters. The 
military’s role in resolving the disaster scenario should be a last resort.  Instead, it is often 
regarded as the first choice. This argument criticises the formation of special disaster 
management military units, their plans, training, and assets that might dominate the process. 
Some claim that governments misuse disasters in order to justify granting the military a greater 
role in civilian affairs in general. They assume that by deploying the military in disaster 
response, civil society relief organisations may become militarised.  The presence of the 
military at a disaster site ipso facto jeopardise the core principles that guide the work of 
international humanitarian agencies and NGOs, i.e. neutrality, impartiality, and independence.  
The militarisation argument is sometimes accompanied by a centralisation thesis which claims 
that, by engaging the military, the country is assuming responsibility for disaster management 
to the detriment of other territorial-political communities, i.e. municipalities, regions, and 
federal states, respectively.  
The functional-humanitarian argument focuses on the pragmatic question of how a military 
presence at a disaster site contributes to overcoming the devastating consequences of the 
disaster.  Proponents of this argument argue that large-scale disasters overwhelm civilian 
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capabilities; therefore military engagement is a conditio sine qua non of effective disaster 
management. People are affected and require assistance; infrastructure is devastated and needs 
to be repaired; and homes are destroyed and need to be rebuilt. Hence, it makes sense to turn to 
a military structure that can provide aid through the application of its manpower, expertise, 
resources, and assets.   
The rejection-isolation argument calls for the military to play only a passive role in disaster 
management.  Its proponents argue that providing relief to society in the case of a disaster 
distracts the military from its primary purpose. They argue that disaster relief reduces an army’s 
capacity for combat missions and in its fight against terrorism. They also request a fair division 
of labour that would not overburden the military. The rejection-isolation argument could be also 
used in cases where even receiving countries impose restrictions on the delivery of military 
humanitarian assistance, either because they fear a foreign military presence on their own 
territory, or they are too proud to admit they need extensive international (military) assistance.  
As a consequence, the military can be seen to become isolated from society while the country 
becomes isolated from the international community.    
An Analyses of Selected Disasters  
Having examined the key theoretical arguments for military deployment in disaster response, 
we will now attempt to detect the presence of these arguments in some of the reported cases of 
predominantly natural disasters that occurred in the world during the period 2002-2011. In 
Table 2, we present the cases which form the core empirical framework of our secondary 
analysis in order to demonstrate the scope of problem faced by both state authorities and the 
crisis management structures when a large-scale disaster occurs.  Some of the cases selected 
were so devastating that they required the engagement of all available national and international 
disaster management resources in order to cope with the consequences, and to normalise life 
following the disaster.   
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Table 2: The Primary Consequences of Recent Large-scale Disastersvii  
DISASTER  DEATH TOLL  OTHER VICTIMS  MATERIAL DAMAGE  
Earthquake and 
tsunami in SouthEast 
Asia, December  
2004  
226,000 (166,000 in 
Indonesia,  
38,000 in Sri  
Lanka, 16,000 in  
India, 5,300 in  
Thailand and 5,000 
foreign tourists)  
over half a million 
injured, while the 
total number 
affected was 
estimated to run to  
5 million  
$9.9 billion; huge long-term 
economic impact  
Hurricane Katrina in 
the US, August, 2005  




$80 billion  
Earthquake in  
Pakistan in October,  
2005   
88,000  100,000 injured  enormous devastation in the 
regions of Azad Jammu and  
Kashmir   
Earthquake in  
Indonesia, May, 2006   
5,749  38,000 injured, 1.2 
million homeless; 
in total 2 million 
affected  
600,000 homes damaged or 
destroyed  
Cyclone Nargis in  
Myanmar, May 2008   
84,500 and 53,800 
reported missing  
2.4 million affected  37 townships significantly 
affected  
Sichuan Earthquake in 
China, May 2008    
almost 90,000 were 
counted as dead or 
missing and 
presumed dead  
nearly 375,000 
injured  
$86 billion  
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Earthquake in Haiti,  
January 2010   




188,383 houses badly damaged 
and 105,000 destroyed  
Floods in Pakistan,  
July and August,  
2010   
1,200 - 2,200  20 million,  millions 
vulnerable to 
malnutrition and 
waterborne disease,  
14 million homeless  
destroyed homes (1.6 million 
houses), crops, and 
infrastructure  
Complex crisis in  
Japan, March 2011  
(earthquake, tsunami,  
nuclear disaster)   
18,500  half a million 
evacuated  
$235 billion (whole cities and 
villages completely devastated)  
Data sources: Pickrell (2005);  Hurricane Katrina;  the 2006 earthquake in Indonesia; Myanmar: Cyclone Nargis  
2008 Facts and Figures (2011); the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir; the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan; the Pakistan  
Floods of 2010; IRIN (2006); Haiti Earthquake Facts and Figures; Oskin (2013);   
The US military has increasingly assumed the role of a disaster response agency both at home 
and abroad, mostly in large-scale disasters.  As a result, it has become an important player in 
national and international disaster response (Kapucu, 2011: 8).  Perry and Travayiakis (2007: 
32) analysed US military support for foreign disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in 
general, and they present their findings from the perspective of the utilitarian argument as a part 
of ‘America’s diplomatic repertoire.’ They regard the engagement of US military capabilities 
abroad as disaster diplomacy that serves to support US strategic interests.  The authors warn 
that critical military assets must not be diverted from the primary combat missions (the 
rejection-isolation argument), and that the appropriate division of labour should also be 
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achieved between military and non-military disaster responders, as well as between national 
and international players.   
Amundson et al. (2008: 236) interpret that the US military response to the tsunami in SouthEast 
Asia in 2004, the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, and the 2006 earthquake in Indonesia through 
the framework of the utilitarian argument. They acknowledge that international civilian 
agencies and NGOs have traditionally been the primary responders to people affected by 
disasters; however, in the recent past, combined civilian and military operations have become 
increasingly frequent. As far as the US is concerned, this is due to the Department of Defence’s 
policy on international operations, which have been ‘extremely effective at improving the status 
and acceptance of the US and its military worldwide’ (ibid.). Polls conducted following the US 
military assistance during the tsunami in South-East Asia and the earthquake in Pakistan 
showed a significant increase in positive sentiments towards the US among both the Indonesian 
and Pakistani population. There is also the added benefit of establishing useful contacts between 
the US military officers involved in the operation and the representatives of other militaries, 
local and international officials, and other stakeholders.   
Brattberg (2013) also shares the belief that disaster relief boosts American soft power diplomacy 
throughout the world by presenting the US as a ‘global force for good’ (the utilitarian argument) 
which should not be underestimated.  This would appear to be especially important given the 
erosion of US influence in the Asia-Pacific region and the growing influence of China. 
Additionally, military engagement in disaster relief may contain the negative consequences of 
major disasters and prevent the crisis from spilling across borders. This is especially true in the 
case of contagious diseases and the refugee flows that follow disasters. Military assistance could 
also improve relations and build trust with other militaries (security-strategic argument).  
Ultimately, by collaborating on disaster relief in other countries, the US has made itself ‘an 
indispensable country’ with a military that is capable of performing large-scale and complex 
relief operations (ibid.).  
17  
  
In his analysis, Tritten (2013) observes the recent US foreign disaster relief through the lenses 
of both the functional-humanitarian and security-strategic arguments: for the afflicted countries, 
disaster relief means the provision of support to the affected people; for the US, it represents an 
opportunity for leverage and influence overseas.  Humanitarian aid is regarded as ‘a way to 
cement key relationships’, especially in the typhoon- and earthquake-prone  
Pacific area.viii   
The US Department of Defence decided to form a specialised unit that would be trained to 
provide prompt assistance in national disasters (Morrisey, 2008). Sceptics perceived this 
process to be a ‘creeping militarism’ of civilian culture and the erosion of the Posse Comitatus  
Act which has prevented the President from using the military in law enforcement within the 
US since 1878.  The majority of US citizens have always opposed military involvement in 
civilian affairs.  Therefore, the militarisation argument was developed in order to describe the 
process of training the military exclusively for disaster response purposes. The attempt by the 
George W. Bush administration to overlook the abovementioned Act as part of the war on 
terrorism exacerbated those fears.  This was followed by the systemic and organisational 
changes of FEMA which became part of the Homeland Security Department in 2003, and which 
many feared became less relevant, less focused on disasters and more on terrorism, and a ‘weak 
sister of the military.’   
The attempted militarization of disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in the US in  
2005 was also questioned by Bay (2005) and Chossudovsky (2005).  According to Bay,  
President Bush asked whether a natural disaster of a certain size would enable the Department 
of Defence to become the lead agency in coordinating and managing the response effort. He 
was not alone in thinking that such a move could improve disaster response. However, many 
warned of the subsequent militarisation and centralisation that are limited by law (Posse 
Comitatus Act, the Stafford Act).  Chossudovsky believes that the Bush administration misused 
major disasters to justify a greater role for the military in civilian affairs.  The Katrina fiasco 
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triggered several comparisons between disasters and terrorism or between disasters and war, 
which led to the conclusion that the military should receive first-responder status.  This was 
also introduced into crisis management documents and is supported by some media. 
Chossudovsky (ibid.) believes that the militarisation of emergency procedures is ‘a done deal’.  
Additionally, this militarisation extends into civil society relief organisations. Although the 
procedures to engage the military in disaster relief are firmly fixed in law, there is a danger, 
warns Chossudovsky, that the Administration could use a national disaster as a pretext ‘for 
introducing martial law and suspending constitutional rights’.   
The Canadian experience in assisting Haiti following the devastating earthquake that hit the 
country in 2010 also deserves a mention.  The argument for deploying civilian and military 
forces was a functional-humanitarian one with an element of utilitarianism in the aspiration. 
Canada’s timely and comprehensive intervention, the efficiency of its response, and the evident 
impact of its financial contributions, resources and personnel clearly made a difference on the 
ground and substantially improved Canada’s image abroad (Mamuji, 2012:  
208). As Mamuji (2012: 220) indicates, the country’s aid objectives have moved from ‘humane 
internationalism’, in which the altruistic provision of assistance and the interests of the 
receiving party had been crucial,  towards ‘international realism’, in which national diplomatic, 
trade, and security gains have become predominant.  In spite of the strong public support for 
the operation at home, some experts questioned Canada’s increasing military involvement in 
disaster management that could result in ‘heightened political control over the provision of 
disaster-relief, particularly demonstrated through the relationship between politics and the 
media (the militarisation argument)’ (Mamuji, 2012: 219-220).ix  
Experts in other countries also took up the issue.  Gautam (2013), discussing the matter through 
the framework of the functional-humanitarian argument, is pragmatic in observing the role of 
India’s military in disaster relief. The military should be a second responder to natural disasters, 
applying the principle: ‘last to enter and first to leave’.  In practice, this rarely holds due to the 
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often ill-preparedness of civil administration to provide an effective response. Gautam (ibid.) 
emphasises the need for the military to achieve greater operational capability: In several cases 
the military had not been well enough prepared nor adequately equipped to deal with natural 
disasters.   
The 2005 earthquake in Pakistan revealed the country ill-prepared for a disaster of this 
magnitude, having no mechanism for effective disaster preparedness and no governmental 
instrument (department or agency) dedicated to disaster response (IRIN, 2006). The Pakistan 
Government took the logical step of mobilising the military to perform disaster response and 
appointed an army general to manage the effort. The military was evidently the only organised 
force in the country that could provide the necessary assistance in a crisis.  However, the 
International Crisis Group was critical of the military, arguing that the military machine that led 
the national and international relief work deliberately bypassed and disempowered civilian 
structures and the civilian administration in the affected areas (the militarisation argument). 
However, the already limited civilian structures had been damaged, paralysed, and even 
destroyed by the disaster, and were therefore unable to provide any effective disaster 
management.   
The 2004 tsunami in South-East Asia, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in US, the 2008 earthquake 
in Sichuan, China, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and the 2010 floods in Pakistan all confirmed 
the increasing role of the various militaries in responding to natural disasters (Madiwale and 
Virk, 2011: 1086).  The reasons behind such developments were an increase in the incidence 
and scale of natural disasters – a concurrent trend towards the militarisation of humanitarian 
response to conflict situations – and an increased interest in disaster response on the part of 
militaries (the militarisation argument).  The latter is a consequence of the desire to improve 
the military’s public perception, staff morale, training, opportunities, and therefore treat 
humanitarian operations as a means for the armed forces to diversify their roles and expertise 
(the utilitarian argument).   
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Drawing on the experience of the 2010 floods in Pakistan, Madiwale and Virk (ibid.) argue that 
the military can play a vital role in disaster response and that this view is widely held by the 
international humanitarian community. The military’s contributions to disaster relief include:  
search and rescue capacities, logistical support, expertise, material resources for infrastructure 
projects, and trained manpower (the functional-humanitarian argument). However, 
humanitarian workers express regular concern that their core principles – impartiality, 
neutrality, and independence - could be challenged by a military presence.  As a consequence, 
the security and action of humanitarian agencies could be jeopardised (the militarisation 
argument).   
The engagement of Japanese Defence Forces (JDF) in Aceh, Indonesia, after the tsunami that 
hit South-East Asia in December 2004 is also noteworthy (Arcala Hall, 2008: 383).  Japan’s 
role as an aggressor during the Second World War meant that the deployment of its military 
overseas was a sensitive matter, although the JDF increasingly collaborate in a variety of ‘non-
use-of-force missions’. Since it is expected that in a disaster relief operation the military will 
perform civilian tasks (policing, relief provision, post-conflict reconstruction, civil 
administration, etc.), a foreign military presence may be regarded with some concern by the 
receiving countries. Arcala Hall (2008: 384) thinks that the ‘militarisation’ of civilian functions 
might also set the armed forces in direct competition with international humanitarian agencies 
and NGOs. The interface between civilian and military structures thus crosses borders and 
functions, while the rules of engagement are still being formalised. The cost-benefit issues of 
overseas troop deployment and the sensitivities of the receiving countries to a foreign military 
presence on their soil must also be taken into account.   
In reference to the above case, Arcala Hall (2008: 395) makes the following security-strategic 
argument:  how can the authorities of the recipient country allow a foreign military presence 
within their territory without compromising their sovereignty? By contrast, the sending 
country’s rationale (in this particular case Japan) can be explained by the utilitarian argument: 
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deployment is a foreign policy decision based on the calculation of a gain in international 
prestige against the costs of deployment.  The latter should not be overlooked due to the fact 
that, as a rule, foreign military support is requested only in extraordinary circumstances in which 
heavy logistics and a large ground force are required.  In the case of Japan, we could perhaps 
add a further security-strategic argument, namely that US policy actually encourages Japan to 
be more active in the region and to assume greater responsibility for its security, meaning that 
by taking an active role in regional disaster response Japan potentially improves its security 
relations with the US.   
Barber (2009) also raises an important point of international law with regard to those countries 
that reject foreign disaster assistance (the rejection-isolation argument), as Myanmar did during 
cyclone Nargis in 2008.  The government of Myanmar imposed significant restrictions on the 
delivery of humanitarian aid which triggered a debate as to whether international actions have 
a ‘responsibility to protect’ populations from the bad policy decisions of their governments in 
a disaster.  It was suggested that the legal doctrine could be invoked to justify military 
intervention for the purpose of delivering humanitarian aid to the survivors of the cyclone. An 
analysis of customary international law revealed that, in this particular case, the restrictions 
imposed by the Myanmar government were not so strict as to justify military intervention. The 
Intertect Study (1989) addressed the similar issue of crisis victims’ ‘right to assistance’:  some 
experts have argued that military forces representing the international community should 
provide safe passage for relief commodities and personnel without the consent of the affected 
country.   
Discussion and Conclusions  
Our analysis of the theoretical considerations of military deployment in disaster response 
reveals that the arguments most frequently invoked in the discourse are the utilitarian, security-
strategic, militarisation, functional-humanitarian, and rejection-isolation arguments.  However, 
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an empirical review of actual military disaster responses reveals which of these arguments are 
most frequently invoked in real-life scenarios.  It would be impossible to perform an exact 
statistical analysis of the various arguments, nevertheless recent practice would seem to confirm 
that the militarisation argument is most popular, followed by the utilitarian argument.  The latter 
does not advocate the engagement of the military in disaster response on the basis of the needs 
of the affected population, but rather on the basis of the benefits accruing to the states and 
institutions (the military) that offer such assistance.  The former warns that an increased military 
presence in disaster management may threaten the operating principles of civilian agencies and 
humanitarian organisations and may lead to their gradual replacement with military structures.  
These two arguments are followed by the functional-humanitarian and security-strategic 
arguments. The former is predominantly concerned with the affected population, their property 
and infrastructure, and instead regards the military an actor that is capable of significantly 
contributing to the more rapid and effective management of the post-disaster situation.  The 
latter addresses the question of how military assistance could improve international security by 
reinforcing strategic relations between states. The rejection-isolation argument is the least 
present in the analysis and is sceptical of the use of the military in disaster response due to a 
concern that its capabilities will be diverted from its primary duties, such as combat and counter-
terrorism.  Our analysis of the arguments reveals a lively debate on the role of the military in 
disaster management.  However, somewhat surprisingly, the needs of the disaster-stricken 
population do not necessarily assume primary importance in this debate.   
We have therefore answered the first research question concerning the identity of the primary 
theoretical arguments, so let us turn to second question, whether these arguments can predict 
the characteristics of civil-military relations in disaster management.  Taking into account the 
characteristics of disasters and the legal bases for military engagement, the nature of the 
arguments and the motives behind them do predict the characteristics of civil-military relations 
in disaster management to a certain degree.  Utilitarian and security-strategic arguments 
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emphasise the important benefits to the political establishment and the military; the benefit to 
the affected population, the civilian search and rescue teams, and the humanitarian 
organisations is of secondary importance. Consequently, we might expect friction between the 
various military and civilian crisis management actors.  The militarisation argument puts 
pressure on civil-military relations.  This pressure comes from the civilian and humanitarian 
side, especially when the civilian structure capabilities for managing the disaster are low and 
the readiness of the civilian disaster management structures to accept military assistance is also 
low.  This anticipates potential problems.  The rejection-isolation argument could create conflict 
between a military that is reluctant to engage in disaster management, and civilian authorities 
and the public who want it to engage.  The functional-humanitarian argument on the other hand 
foresees a certain degree of harmony in civil-military relations because it best serves the 
interests of all the stakeholders involved.  This is especially true when the military’s operational 
preparedness to engage in disaster management is high and when the general public also have 
high expectations of the military’s ability to perform well in a disaster management situation.   
Our analysis serves as a comprehensive review of the arguments concerning military 
engagement in disaster management and considers some of the possible impacts they may have 
on the development of civil-military relations in the specific circumstances of disaster 
management. However, our work marks only the beginning of research.  Subsequent studies 
might consider addressing the following six issues which we have raised.  (1) The fact that some 
stakeholders in disaster management fear a military presence, while admitting that military 
assistance is required due to the skills, equipment, and resources that it can provide. (2) Despite 
the fact that the role of the armed forces in providing disaster assistance is a legal duty, its level 
of operational preparedness to act effectively in disaster management is rather limited.  (3) Even 
if military commanders were better prepared (specialised units, training, planning and better 
collaboration with civilian structures), there remains a general fear in disaster-management 
circles of a militarisation of disaster response.  (4) On the one hand, the military perceives 
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disaster management as an opportunity to improve their image and legitimacy, and on the other, 
they worry that disaster response engagement might hamper the effectiveness of their other 
duties (combat missions, fighting terrorism, peace operations, etc.).  (5) Civilian disaster 
management structures require military assistance in cases where they are overwhelmed by the 
scope and severity of the disaster, yet at the same time they compete with military structures 
(disaster as an opportunity) and fear the predominance of military structures in their sphere. 
They also fear that their culture and values may become ‘contaminated’ if they were to 
frequently collaborate with the military.  6) Civilian and military disaster management 
structures are forced to collaborate in disaster response, but they do not invest enough will and 
energy in improving coordination, common planning, training, standardising equipment where 
possible, nor in the development of civil-military cooperation best practice.  
Future research should be directed towards resolving the above mentioned tensions between 
and within the civilian and military structures in order to improve both national and international 
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i A disaster is included in the database if one of the following criterion is met: more than 10 people are reported 
dead; more than 100 people are reported affected; a declaration of a state of emergency; or a call for international 
assistance (CRED, 2013: 7).  ii For example, UNOCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), the 
EU Civil Protection Mechanism and NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning.   
iii Freudenburg (1997: 19, 20) argues that the history of disaster research began when military planners 
began to consider ways in which communities might respond to nuclear attack. Although this argument is 
disputable, it is now evident that various natural, technological and man-made disasters attract the attention of 
researchers. The focus has profoundly changed.    
iv Forster (2002) called upon researchers to be more theoretically and methodologically courageous in 
overcoming the traditional approaches.  
v It is worth mentioning that when peacekeeping became a predominant duty of the armed forces after the 
Cold War, scholars noticed its impact on civil-military relations, especially on the legitimacy of the armed forces 
in civil society (e.g. van der Meulen, 2003). vi See also Malešič (2014). vii The selection criteria was a combination 
of there being a sizeable disaster plus the major involvement of the military in the disaster management.  
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viii The operation for US military assistance to Japan during the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in 
2011 was named Tomodachi (Friend).   
ix The research carried out in Ontario among civilian crisis managers revealed that the latter were slightly 
more opposed to the militarisation of the crisis response (the presence of the military in the process) than they 
were opposed to their own militarisation (civilian organisations following a military model) (Etkin et al., 2014: 
14).    
